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and in modern economic history the United States, 
Japan, Germany, and China have had prominent periods 
of growth polarity. The paper goes on to analyze the 
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The post-nancial crisis global environment has been marked by a sharp rise in international
economic tensions. Heightened protectionist sentiment and accusations of exchange rate ma-
nipulation have given rise to talk of trade collapse and currency wars. These tensions have
manifested themselves in international fora, such as the stalled Doha Round and stalemate at
the recent Seoul G20 meetings. While frictions in the global policy dialog are not new, the
increased assertiveness expressed by the large emerging market powers suggests that deeper
forces are afoot. What are the changes taking place in the global landscape that may be driving
this phenomenon?
We contend in this paper that a large part of the explanation lies in the increasing multi-
polarity in international economic relations. The increasingly important role of the developing
world in driving global economic growth translates into real economic power. While the de-
veloped economies of today dominated global economic production, consumption, transactions,
and institutions throughout much of the 20th century, they are increasingly ceding economic
prominence to the emerging world, with the share of the Global North shrinking from about 59
to 44 percent of world GDP between 1973 and 2008. International economic 
ows, such as trade
and investment, increasingly originate from, and are destined for, countries in the Global South.
This paper seeks to make sense of these shifts in global economic power, from the perspective
of economic growth and in
uence.
Of course, such shifts in global economic polarity are not new. Throughout the trajectory of
modern economic history, each phase of global growth has been driven by a small set of countries,
often called global \growth poles." Between the Tang and Ming dynasties (600-1600), China
was a dominant force in the global economy, accounting for a quarter of its output and as much
as a third of its growth. The Renaissance saw the beginning of the rise in the economies of
Western Europe|beginning rst with Italy, Portugal, and Spain; then, with the advent of the
Industrial Revolution, France, Great Britain, and Belgium|accompanied by a transformation
of incomes, production, and trade. Following the Second World War, global growth was led not
only by the United States|especially the mutually reinforcing engines of American innovation
and strong consumer demand|but by postwar Germany, Japan, and the former Soviet Union,
which were also economic drivers in their own right.
In spite of the widespread use of the expression \growth poles" in the policy discourse, there
has been little consensus as to accepted denitions of the term. In this paper, we undertake the
task of formally dening several alternative measures of growth poles, drawing on the theoretical
literature that has examined the manner by which growth in a given country can potentially
in
uence the growth in others. We go on and compute a range of dierent polarity measures for
nation states in the global economy, and demonstrate the relative robustness of our benchmark
measure.
The term \growth pole" was originally used to describe a growth process located in economic
space, and incorporated spillover considerations (Perroux 1950). However, the term quickly took
2on a geographic or spatial dimension, and existing explorations of growth poles have focused on
vertical linkages and external economies of scale in that regard. While a better understanding
of the tension between forces supporting greater agglomeration versus specialization have clear
value from both the point of view of theory (Fujita, Krugman & Venables 1999) as well as policy
(Bank 2009), this focus on physical space has meant that empirical papers in this vein take on,
almost by denition, a regional tone (see, for example, Anselin (2003) or Fingleton (2001)). As
a consequence, the rich linkage, multiplier, and spillover eects are accorded more in terms of
geographic rather than economic space.
This shortcoming in the existing empirical literature becomes amply clear in the global
context, where growth spillovers often span standard geographic boundaries. India's largest
trading partners, for example, do not include Pakistan nor Bangladesh, and U.S. out
ows of
FDI are destined for China as much as they are for Canada.1 However, empirical growth papers
that incorporate spatial elements tend to be constrained to notions of absolute geographic
position (Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger 1999; Moreno & Trehan 1997; Rodrik, Subramanian &
Trebbi 2004). Even studies that employ much more sophisticated techniques to the study of
spatial elements|as embodied in the spatial econometrics and growth literature (see Rey &
Janikas (2005) for a recent review)|similarly limit their focus to relative physical space. A
clear gap remains in the profession's understanding of growth poles, as they apply at the global
level.
Moreover, with the bulk of the academic literature focused on theoretical expositions, the
empirical study of growth poles has also been limited to fairly narrow treatments of the topic.
Many papers that consider some aspect of growth polarity are focused mainly on one channel|
that of technological spillovers (Coe & Helpman 1995)|and considerations of alternative trans-
mission channels have resorted to the somewhat unsatisfactory approach of using physical space
as a proxy for all other bilateral ties (Keller 2002). Furthermore, the scope of most studies are
intra-country or regional in nature. To the extent that the literature has considered cross-
country studies of growth externalities, these tend to be focused more on negative, rather than
positive, spillover eects (Ades & Chua 1997; Murdoch & Sandler 2002).
The elds of political science and international relations have long been interested in the
study of the distribution of power. However, existing papers discussing the issue of multipolarity
typically employ concentration measures premised on some vaguely-dened notion of power,
such as economic or political power, and more often than not these are simply attributed to
size (Manseld 1993; Ray & Singer 1973). In addition, measures of this form tend to capture
contemporaneous distributions of power, rather than potential paths of in
uence. Finally, the
treatment of economic polarity in this context is somewhat primitive, ignoring how knowledge
transfer, agglomeration economies, gains from exchange, and spillover externalities that allow
the pole to potentially in
uence growth elsewhere.
1Nor should this be too surprising. The gravity model (of trade) suggests that bilateral trade volumes are
determined primarily by both economic size and physical distance, and neatly captures both of these dimensions
in cross-country economic relations.
3Other classical power indices, such as the Penrose (1946)-Banzhaf (1965) index or the Shap-
ley & Shubik (1954) index, are reasonable measures of in
uence, especially as it pertains to
bargaining power. However, in the context of international economic relations, the biggest
drawback is that voting indices require a voting mechanism to be operational and/or relevant,
which may not be the case in many forms of international interactions. Furthermore, like con-
centration indices, voting indices likewise do not capture any growth or growth spillover eects.
Measures of multipolarity would clearly benet from a more well-dened measure of power
shares.2
Our calculations suggest that China, Western Europe, and the United States have been
important growth poles over the broad course of world history, and in modern economic history
the United States, Japan, Germany, and China have had prominent periods of growth polarity.
In the most recent 2004{08 period, China, India, and Russia appear poised to be growth poles
among the emerging economies, with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea possessing the
potential as well.
The paper goes on to the analyze the determinants of such growth poles, taking into care-
ful account the possible endogeneity and simultaneity issues that may be of concern. We nd
that among proximate determinants, per capita income and the dependency ratio are espe-
cially important, while institutional quality and economic integration appear to be more central
fundamental determinants.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) provides the theoretical
background for the various transmission channels considered in the construction of the empirical
measure (Section 3). This section also reports estimates of growth poles using the available
international data, along with various robustness checks for the measure. Section 4 considers
the proximate and fundamental factors that underlie growth polarity, and Section 5 applies the
measure to consider the phenomenon of multipolarity. A nal section concludes with the way
forward.
2 From poles to periphery: channels by which poles drive global
growth
There is no absolute consensus regarding which fundamental channels transmit growth from
one economy to another. However, a handful of channels are strongly suggested by at least
some theory and empirical evidence. There are strong theoretical underpinnings for the idea
that technological progress is a key driver of long-run growth (Romer 1990; Solow 1956). This
suggests that we begin by considering channels by which technologies diuse from one economy
2A recent literature has also emphasized power exerted through indirect or sociocultural in
uence, or \soft"
power (Nye 2004). However, soft power is (almost by denition) dicult to quantify. Although proxies may
be available|such as the global spread of a country's language, education institutions, or national values and
philosophy|measures that have emerged from the literature remain largely subjective, limited in scope, and are
not systematically produced.
4to others.3 These include 
ows of knowledge through trade, capital 
ows, or migration, as well
as more direct 
ows of technology embodied in physical and human capital.
In addition to diusion of technology itself, we might also consider the diusion of any
underlying factor that promotes technological progress, especially the transfer of institutions
that shape incentives to develop new technologies or to adopt existing technologies. Although,
intuitively, the transfer of economic institutions may be quite important, institutional change is
typically dicult to measure, and slow; attempting to capture international transmission of most
kinds of institutional change would present even further diculties. However, some institutional
transfer may be captured simply by the data on a potential pole's growth rate and the size of
its economy. It is plausible that when reform of economic institutions promotes growth, people
in other countries take notice and demand similar reforms of their own governments. Moreover,
the larger the economy in which the reforms and growth took place, and the more rapid the
growth, the more conscious people in other countries will be of these events, ceteris paribus.
Trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and international migration may also facilitate some
transfer of economic institutions, and these should be considered in evaluating potential poles in
any case, since they may be important channels by which technological knowledge is transferred
between economies.
Trade may propagate growth from poles to periphery economies, at least in part as a channel
of technological diusion. Grossman & Helpman (1991b) provide a theoretical framework in
which knowledge accumulation by domestic industrial agents depends on the extent of contact
with their foreign counterparts, and thus on their levels of commercial exchange with foreign
rms, so that the evolution of comparative advantage and technological progress are interlinked
and jointly determined. Trade in intermediate goods, in particular, may also function as a
channel of technology diusion and spillover in a second, weaker way, distinct from knowledge
spillovers: intermediate goods embody technologies, so importation of intermediate goods can
reduce costs of product development and production of new products (Eaton & Kortum 2002;
Grossman & Helpman 1991a; Rivera-Batiz & Romer 1991).
The broad implication that trade and FDI may be important channels of technology dif-
fusion is supported by a small body of empirical research. For example, Hallward-Driemeier,
Iarossi & Sokolo (2002) nd that, in East Asia, rm openness is associated with subsequent
advantages in rm-level productivity. However, this result is only strong for less developed
countries in the region, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. There is greater empirical sup-
port for importation as a signicant channel of technology diusion than exportation; however,
a pole may drive growth in a periphery economy simply by absorbing its exports and driving
expansion of exporting industries. Exportation is also associated with intraindustry reallocation
of production from low-productivity to high-productivity rms (Melitz 2003), and in some in-
dustries, market size eects stemming from increasing returns to scale (Krugman 1979). Thus,
it is plausible that growth may be driven by bidirectional trade: both importing from a pole,
3For a survey of this literature, see Keller (2004).
5and exporting to a pole.
Capital 
ows, particularly FDI, may also be an important channel of technological diusion.
Theoretically, multinational parents may transfer technological knowledge to their subsidiaries
(Ethier 1986; Markusen 2004). Knowledge may spill over from subsidiaries to other rms
in the host country through labor turnover (Fosfuri, Motta & Rnde 2001). Multinationals
can also provide subsidiaries with technology embodied in intermediate goods and services
(Rodr guez-Clare 1996). However, there is only weak empirical evidence that FDI is, more
broadly, an important channel of technological diusion, and the evidence that FDI facilitates
large intraindustry spillovers is also decidedly mixed. Large intraindustry spillovers are found
primarily in some case studies of high-technology FDI projects (for example in the case of
microchip-maker Intel in Costa Rica, as studied by Larra n, L opez-Calva & Rodr guez-Clare
(2001)) and studies of samples of rms drawn from relatively high-technology sectors (as in
the case of Keller & Yeaple (2009) for U.S. manufacturing). Firm-level studies using broader
samples have typically found evidence of only small intraindustry spillovers (Grith, Redding
& Simpson 2004; Haskel, Pereira & Slaughter 2007). There is also some evidence of vertical
spillovers, which tend to be somewhat stronger. For example, Javorcik (2004) nds evidence of
technological spillovers from FDI through backward linkages in rm-level Lithuanian data, from
partly foreign owned rms to their domestic suppliers, but not from fully foreign-owned rms;
while AlAzzawi (2011) nds a strong positive eect of both inward and outward FDI when a
multinational corporation establishes a foreign subsidiary.
Overall, it appears that technology diusion is facilitated by some forms of FDI, and by
FDI in high-technology sectors. FDI may also promote growth through other channels than
technology diusion, such as reallocation of production to relatively productive sectors, and to
relatively productive rms within sectors. More broadly, nancial openness in general can pro-
mote growth, especially when such liberalization is combined with complementary institutional
reform, which spurs domestic nancial market development and fosters growth4 (Beck & Levine
2005; Quinn & Toyoda 2008). Thus, capital 
ows may indeed be an important channel through
which poles drive global growth.
It is likely that technological knowledge is generally dicult or impossible to codify fully,
so that some technological knowledge remains tacit and can only be passed on from person
to person (David 1993; Polanyi 1958). Theory has long suggested that labor mobility can
promote knowledge spillovers (Arrow 1962), including between countries. Empirical evidence
supports the hypothesis that both migration and short-term business travel facilitate diusion
of tacit technological knowledge. For example, Oettl & Agrawal (2008) nd that international
labor mobility not only promotes knowledge 
ows to the rms who hire immigrants, but also
knowledge spillovers to other rms in the economy. Kim, Lee & Marschke (2009) study US
rms access to non-U.S. R&D output by employing workers with foreign research experience,
and nd evidence that this is a signicant channel for the diusion of knowledge to the U.S.
4For a recent survey article on nancial liberalization and growth, see Obstfeld (2009)
6from foreign countries. Hovhannisyan & Keller (2010) analyze data on international business
travel from the U.S. to 74 other countries, and nd that it has an eect on innovation in these
countries beyond the usual technology transfer through trade and FDI. The stock of migrants
itself may also induce network eects from increased trade (Rauch 2001) and knowledge transfer
(Kerr 2008; Kerr & Lincoln 2010). Even the fact of immigration can be a source of growth for
the recipient nation, as migrants tend to be self-selected as industrious and seeking opportunity
(McCraw 2010).
3 Empirical measures of growth polarity
3.1 Measure construction
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it are the output share and growth rate of country i at time t, which means
that a growth pole as dened in (1) is simply the size-adjusted growth rate of the economy.
(1) is the standard approach to decomposing the relative contribution of each country to global
growth. While intuitive and direct, such a measure would be incomplete. Critically, it fails to
embody the manner by which growth poles exert their polarity, in the sense of capturing the
transmission and spillover mechanisms for the country's growth to others in its economic space.
The natural extension of (1) is then to allow for such alternative channels of growth trans-
mission, by replacing the size weight in (1) with weights corresponding to these channels. The
literature has identied a range of alternative channels, and the theoretical justications un-
derpinning these dierent media was discussed in detail in Section 2. Here we list the dierent
channels and propose empirical measures designed to capture these eects.
To capture the trade channel|which captures both the direct eect of absorption of other
nations' exports, along with the indirect eect of facilitating technology transfer through trade








7where mit is the total imports of country i at time t, and Xt =
PN
j xjt is total global exports.5









where absorption ait = cit+iit+git is comprised of consumption c, investment i, and government
spending g on goods and services, all for country i at time t.
The nancial channel counterpart captures the direct eects of easing liquidity constraints
in recipient economies, while also providing indirect benets from increased leverage along with








where foit is the capital out
ows from country i at time t, and FIt =
PN
j fijt is aggregate
global capital in
ows. Given the importance of FDI 
ows in knowledge and technology transfer,








where fdiit is total FDI (in
ows and out
ows) for country i at time t, and FDIt =
PN
j fdijt
is total global FDI. The use of bidirectional FDI 
ows is consistent with the empirical evidence
that FDI promotes technology transfer, regardless of its direction.
The migration channel not only serves to alleviate labor shortages, it can carry valuable hu-
man capital and embedded knowledge across borders, as well as yield network eects emanating








where it is the immigrant stock resident in country i at time t, and t =
PN
j jt is the sum











where migration in this case is limited to that of skilled labor, dened either in terms of Barro
& Lee (1993)-style educational attainment, or more specically in terms of workers in a certain
profession (such as those located in the technological sector).
5An alternative specication would be to exclude country i from the measure, so that Xt =
PN 1
C i . While
such an exclusion may be theoretically appealing in that it avoids self-referential spillovers, such calculations
are problematic in practice. First, the calculated measure will no longer be directly comparable across dierent
countries, since the weights applied will share dierent denominators. Second, the measure would also introduce
bias toward larger exporters (since the denominator will now be smaller), and since large exporters are also likely
to be large importers, the weights on these economies will be further distorted by these economies.








where ait is a measure of technological spillovers by country i at time t, and At =
PN
j ajt is
technological spillovers for the world as a whole. By and large, ait is not directly observable.
Nonetheless, it can be proxied by indicators such as total citations for a country's patents by
foreigners, or more crudely by the total number of approved patents held by a given country
(Hall, Jae & Trajtenberg 2001), or the total number of scientic articles published by residents
of a given country.
3.2 Data sources and adjustments
We take the measures (1){(5) to the data, drawing on long historical GDP data from Maddi-
son (2003), and modern data from a combination of several alternative databases. The former
dataset spans 1{2001, but since only output data are available, with substantial gaps, it is only
used for the computation of (1) (and for illustrative purposes rather than formal analysis).
The latter measures draw on data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (out-
put data) and Global Migration Database (migration data), the IMF's International Financial
Statistics (nancial data) and Direction of Trade Statistics (trade data), and an esoteric mix of
science and technology databases, such as the WIPO Patentscope database and the NSF science
and engineering indicators (technology data). These were then merged with a series of control
variables obtained, among other sources, the WDI and IFS. These are described in detail in the
technical appendix.
There are two possible candidate measures for the growth rate gy. The most straightforward
measure, which we apply as our benchmark, is the real growth rate, measured in constant 2000
U.S. dollars. However, over longer periods of time, such growth rates will be distorted by the
Penn eect. Consequently, we also utilize the growth rate obtained from an output series that
has been adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).
Since the focus of the polarity measures are on longer-term growth spillovers rather than
cyclical factors, all candidate series were subsequently ltered with a Hodrik-Prescott lter to
extract only the trend component (using  = 6:25), before annual growth rates were calculated
from this extracted trend.6 Where necessary, the output series were interpolated in order to
obtain unbroken series that would be amenable to the HP lter.
Several other variables were also cleaned to reduce the eects of idiosyncratic variation
that would have exaggerated the weighting. For example, the trade data were corrected for
reexports for the major entrep^ ot economies of Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and the United
Arab Emirates. The nancial 
ows measure excludes derivative transactions, since these are
6Due to the substantial volatility present in the other data series, they were not similarly ltered, as doing so
would have called for a very large smoothing parameter.
9often more indicative of nancial market turnover rather than actual growth-enhancing capital

ows.
Annual values of (1){(5) were then computed using each of these three candidate growth
measures. To further smooth the nal series, which may display excess annual variation due to
the unltered weights, 5-year moving averages were calculated from the annual series. For the
purposes of the regressions reported in Section 4, all variables were log-transformed.
3.3 Computations of growth polarity
Figure 1 plots the long historical evolution (Figure 1(a)) and modern economic history (Fig-
ure 1(b)) of the contribution to global growth (1), for a set of selected economies. As can be
seen, China, Western Europe, and the United States have been important growth poles over the
broad course of world history. Several features are notable. First, over the course of two mil-
lennia, there have been large swings in the polarities of the dierent countries/country groups;
the evolution of polarity is marked by irregular cyclicality. Second, dierent countries have as-
sumed the role of a dominant pole for global growth over time. In particular, China, the United
States, and Western Europe (as a whole) have all had periods where their economies have been
the primary driver of global growth. Third, the historical contributions of poles in the past
are generally dominated, in absolute terms, by the contributions of more contemporary poles.
Fourth, the general upward trend evident for many of the countries in Figure1(b) is indicative
of the long-run acceleration of global growth that began early in the second millennium (with
a second burst in the 1800s) and persisted through until the 1970s.
Finally, the trajectory of mature economies appears to be falling over time, while that of
the emerging world, especially China, appears to be rising. This nal stylized feature is clearest
when examining the period of modern economic growth (Figure 1(b)). The major emerging
economies all demonstrate 
at or rising time trends, while the opposite holds for the mature
economies.7 Notably, China has increasingly become the prominent developing-country pole
since the beginning of economic reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Deng Xiaoping.
Going beyond the simple measure, the other measures suggest that the specic weight
employed in the computation of the polarity measure matters, since dierences arise depending
on the specic channel chosen. Table 1 reports the cross section of the top 10 economies as
ranked under the dierent alternative polarity measures (2){(5), using the 5-year average over
2004{2008.
We gather four facts from this table. First, the specic polarity measure matters: for
example, China|as the world's largest exporter|naturally arises as (far and away) the most
signicant trade growth pole, while the United States is the unquestioned technological leader.8
7Simple tted linear trendlines for Germany, France, and Japan are downward sloping, while those for China,
India, and Russia are upward sloping (Brazil's is 
at).
8China's strong standing as a nancial pole is perhaps somewhat surprising, and is driven by our decision to
include reserve holdings in our capital 
ows measure. Absent reserve accumulation, which is arguably a relevant
measure of nancial strength and in







































Source: Authors' calculations, from Maddison (2009)
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Source: World Bank staff calculations, from Maddison (2009)
(b) Modern economic history
Figure 1: Time paths of selected economies according to contribution to global growth, 1{1999
(top panel) and 1951{2008 (bottom panel). Growth rate calculated as compound annual (ve-
year average annual) growth rate for the long historical (modern history) periods. Western
Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Former USSR in-
cludes all successor republics of the former Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The time series on the abscissa of Figure 1(a) is not
scaled to constant intervals.
11Second, there is some sensitivity of the polarity measure when measured by either real or PPP-
adjusted growth rates. South Korea, in particular, tends to feature more prominently when the
latter are utilized.
Third, secondary measures of related indicators corroborate, albeit imperfectly, the qualita-
tive ndings of the primary indicator. Capital 
ows, as measured by bilateral FDI and growth
in real terms, place China (0.00563), Luxembourg (0.00262), the U.S. (0.00259), and the U.K.
(0.00127) in the top four positions, very similar to the baseline capital 
ows measure. Likewise,
using domestic absorption instead of imports to capture trade 
ows ranks the U.S. (0.00810),
China (0.00736), Japan (0.00246), and India (0.00206) in the top pole positions (as measured
by growth in PPP terms).9 Indeed, correlations between these secondary indicators and the
main ones employed, as reported in Table 2, are remarkably high, with perhaps the exception
of the migration indicators.
Last, while the dierent measures tend to identity similar countries when the polarity mea-
sure is strong (which usually amounts to the top three countries by each measure), there is
less denitiveness when the dierences in polarity are more clustered. For example, despite
Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Jordan, and Singapore being relatively small countries, they feature
strongly in some subindices. These tend to be rationalizable as either due to unique comparative
advantages, or historical circumstance. Singapore and Luxembourg intermediate a large share
of capital due to their roles as nancial centers; this lends to their relatively strong showing ac-
cording to the PF measure. The higher showing of former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan
and Ukraine in the PM measure is potentially of more concern, since much of the migratory

ows in those cases were due to the exodus of labor in response to post-transition diculties;
such induced movement should perhaps be interpreted more a sign of economic weakness in the
sending economy, rather than strength.
Table 2 is also suggestive of the importance of accounting for multiple channels of growth
spillovers. The cross correlations between the dierent measures, while appreciable, are not
excessively high. As such, each channel is likely to embody informational content that is not
well captured by the other channels, which attests to the value of introducing various alternative
measures.
3.4 An aggregate measure of growth polarity
In order to provide more denitiveness to the selection of growth poles (and reduce over-reliance
on a single dimension), we generate an index based on the (rst)10 principal component for the
collection of measures (2){(5), which we label P.11 The top 10 countries by this synthetic
to the position of London as a major global nancial hub.
9Calculations for these secondary measures are available on request.
10The use of only the rst component is veried by both scree and eigenvalue plots, which suggest that only
the rst component be included.
11Although principal components is our preferred aggregation methodology for producing the index, alternative
aggregation mechanisms actually yield surprisingly similar results. The correlation between a simple average and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13Table 2: Correlation between primary and secondary weights,
1979{2010, in real GDP growth rates*
PT PT0 PF PF0 PA PA0 PM PM0
PT y 1.000
PT0z 0.800 1.000
PF 0.575 0.674 1.000
PF0 0.592 0.758 0.546 1.000
PA 0.628 0.731 0.362 0.415 1.000
PA0 0.851 0.947 0.769 0.884 0.919 1.000
PM 0.581 0.579 0.289 0.425 0.550 0.730 1.000
PM0 0.533 0.318 0.278 0.331 0.090 0.252 0.369 1.000
* Authors' calculations, using data from the WDI, DOT, IFS, Global Migration,
Patentscope, and NSF databases. Growth rates calculated from GDP data in
real 2000 U.S. dollars.
y Main measures of trade, nance, technology, and migration computed from im-
ports, nancial out
ows, patent citations, and immigrant stock.
z Secondary measures of trade, nance, technology, and migration computed from
absorption, bilateral FDI, scientic articles, and skilled labor emigration.
measure, calculated with and without the inclusion of migration, and with both real and PPP
growth rates, are reported in Table 3.12
The computed measures in this case are far more stable, and the two clearest poles to emerge
are the United States and China. By and large, however, it appears that in addition to these
two economies, a mix of advanced (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom) and emerging (India,
Russia, South Korea) economies share the role of being growth poles for the global economy, at
least based on the 2004{08 period.
Table 3 captures several other interesting facts. First, it is important to recognize that the
ordering of economies above are not one-for-one matches with economic size. Indeed, several
large developed economies|such as Germany and France|appear several notches lower than
their economic sizes alone would suggest; likewise, several emerging economies, in particular
South Korea and Singapore, assume a greater weight than one would expect by GDP alone.
Moreover, some regional heavyweights|such as Egypt and South Africa|do not appear in
Table 3, likely because of their relatively small economic size (when measured at the global level),
coupled with the fact that their growth spillovers are likely contained within their respective
regions.
Finally, the uneven distribution of growth polarity is evident: The top two economies typ-
ically account for as much as 80 percent of the world total. This result has an interesting
factors.
12Migration is problematic for three reasons, which justies our selective inclusion. First, the data are for
the stock of migration, as opposed to the 
ow measures for the other indicators. Second, migration data are
currently only available for one year, 2005. Third, as alluded to earlier, migration may capture not only positive
spillover eects from a sending nation, but also the possibility of negative shocks in the sending nation, such as
war, natural disasters, or economic crises.
14Table 3: Top 10 countries identied by principal components, 2004{2008
period average, by real and PPP-adjusted GDP growth rates*
Rank Country Real Rank Country PPP
without migration
1 China 8.174 1 China 10.853
2 United States 5.492 2 United States 7.344
3 South Korea 0.805 3 Japan 1.796
4 United Kingdom 0.752 4 Germany 1.331
5 Japan 0.746 5 Russia 1.208
6 India 0.608 6 United Kingdom 0.992
7 Germany 0.563 7 South Korea 0.945
8 Russia 0.459 8 France 0.926
9 France 0.390 9 India 0.685
10 Singapore 0.340 10 Ireland 0.674
with migrationy
1 China 8.187 1 China 10.381
2 United States 6.998 2 United States 9.190
3 Russia 2.260 3 Russia 3.358
4 India 1.806 4 India 1.808
5 United Kingdom 0.761 5 Japan 1.560
6 Germany 0.646 6 Germany 1.505
7 South Korea 0.630 7 United Kingdom 1.126
8 Japan 0.560 8 France 0.986
9 Canada 0.499 9 Spain 0.850
10 Saudi Arabia 0.493 10 Saudi Arabia 0.795
* Authors' calculations, using data from the World Development Indicators. Index gen-
erated from rst principal component of (1){(5), variously excluding and including (4).
Real GDP and PPP-adjusted indicate growth rates calculated from GDP data in real 2000
U.S. dollars and constant 2005 international purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars.
y Migration 
ows are calculated for 2005, the only year where data are available.
parallel in economic geography, where a small fraction of physical space typically accounts for
a disproportionate share of economic activity. Thus, like would be the case for geographically-
concentrated growth poles, global growth poles appear to follow a power law relationship (for
cities, this relationship has been termed Zipf's Law).13
13Annex Figure A.2 illustrates this power law relationship. This non-normality in the key dependent variable
also poses a potential problem for the regressions to follow; a linear logarithmic transform was thus applied to
mitigate this concern, and residual diagnostics are discussed.
154 Factors underlying growth polarity
To better understand the phenomenon of growth poles, this section seeks to establish factors that
underlie the aggregate measure P computed in Subsection 3.4. The most natural candidates for
explanatory variables are those that have been suggested by the cross-country growth literature.
Of course, the number of possible regressors number in the hundreds, and in spite of a large
literature, there is little consensus on which variables are most reasonable to include.
We narrow the set of possible variables using two strategies. First, we limit the analysis to
the variables that have been recognized as important by Bayesian averaging methods (Sala-i-
Martin 1997; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer & Miller 2004). These include factors that are likely
to be correlates, rather than determinants, of growth polarity. Second, we seek to establish
\deep" structural determinants that have been identied in the more recent growth literature
(Rodrik et al. 2004). Accordingly, we classify the former category into proximate factors, and
the latter into fundamental factors.
4.1 Estimation strategy
The proximate correlates regressions were performed using: (a) pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS) with period dummies; (b) models with group eects; and (c) dynamic panel models.
Pooled OLS is included primarily as a benchmark, although some variation across time is
admitted through the period xed eects. The approach thus provides a spotlight on how
cross-sectional heterogeneity may aect growth polarity.
For the second class of estimators, we allow for two-way xed eects, by country and time
period. Random eects (RE) estimates were chosen over xed eects (FE) if justied by a
Hausman test, or if FE estimates were precluded due to the presence of time-invariant variables.
By and large, this specication results in the application of the FE estimator; its ndings thus
rely on within-country variation over time. The main advantage of deploying models with group
eects is that it better recognizes the role of unobserved heterogeneity in driving the results|
important since we are uncertain about the appropriate proximate controls to include|although
causal inference is compromised. The use of group eects models also means that we generally
refrain from introducing additional dummy variables into the empirical model.
The third class of estimators explicitly provides for some (weak) control of endogeneity (at
some cost to eciency). Consequently, we regard these sets of estimates as most authoritative,
although we recognize that the eciency tradeo may mean that fewer regressors appear as
statistically signicant (which may also occur as a result of proper accounting for endogeneity).
System generalized method of moments (GMM) (Arellano & Bond 1991) was chosen over dif-
ference GMM (Arellano & Bover 1995) if Hansen tests suggest that the instruments are valid,
or if (as before) time-invariant variables necessitated its use; otherwise dierence GMM was
implemented. Another added advantage of such models is the robustness of GMM estimates to
violations of normality in the underlying data generation process, which may be a particular
16concern given the distribution of the main dependent variable.
The fundamental determinants regressions were run using: (a) instrumental variables (IV);
and (b) system GMM. Since both of these methods are designed to address endogeneity is-
sues, we are more condent about attributing causality in these cases. The IV estimates are
performed for the 1999{03 cross section, and deployed using the following instruments: for insti-
tutions, settler mortality (IV-1) and fraction of European-language speaking population (IV-2)
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001);14 for integration, the gravity-predicted trade volume
(Frankel & Romer 1999); for human capital, historical enrollment data from 1900 (Glaeser, La
Porta, L opez-de Silanes & Shleifer 2004); and for democracy, the predicted level of democracy
(Decker & Lim 2008). Both geography and social capital were treated as (plausibly) exogenous.
The same set of instruments is used for the dynamic panel estimates. Here, we exploit
additional information available from the panel structure of the dataset to draw additional
insight. We choose system GMM as the preferred estimation method, for two reasons: rst,
since we only have instruments available for one period, panel IV could not be used; second, the
inclusion of geography as a primary time-invariant determinant rules out the use of dierence
GMM.
4.2 Benchmark results
Table 4 reports the results of the benchmark regressions for the proximate correlates of the
aggregate growth polarity measure, computed from real GDP growth rates and excluding mi-
gration 
ows. The rst three columns report the pooled OLS (P1), xed or random eects
(P2), and system or dierence GMM (P3) estimates for the augmented Solow specication
proposed in Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992). The following three columns, (P4){(P6), report
coecients from the same three estimation methodologies using a full specication that includes
the major proximate variables of importance as identied by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).15
The benchmark results from the parsimonious specication given in (P1){(P3) suggest that
education, as captured by enrollment rates, may be an important correlate to growth polarity.
Were this specication correct, educational levels would be positively related to the strength of
an economy as a global growth pole. While this may be the case, there are reasons to believe
that education may be capturing the eect, more generally, of per capita incomes (even after
accounting for possible endogeneity via specication (P3)). This can be seen in specications
(P4){(P6), where the inclusion of GDP per capita results in the enrollment variable falling
out of statistical signicance. Overall, the t for the full specication is stronger, and post-
regression diagnostics for the dynamic panel specications (P3) and (P6) attest to the general
validity of these estimates.16
14The latter set of instruments, although somewhat weaker, are often preferable because of greater data avail-
ability, which consequently increases the otherwise fairly small sample size.
15More precisely, the specication was chosen with an eye toward maximizing sample size and scope. Additional
specications that include variables that compromised this criterion are considered in the annex.
16Residual diagnostics also suggest that concerns about the distribution of the dependent variable were generally
17Table 4: Benchmark regressions for proximate correlates of growth
polarity, 1968{2008, with real GDP growth rates*
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
Population -2.078 -0.053 -1.827 2.767 2.304 -2.794
growth (1.39) (0.18) (1.43) (1.64) (1.41) (2.33)
Investment 0.302 0.083 0.282 0.254 0.257 0.560
(0.22) (0.13) (0.36) (0.24) (0.14) (0.37)
Enrollment 0.116 -0.037 0.335 -0.055 0.009 -0.063
(0.04) (0.06) (0.13) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12)
Income per 0.095 0.103 0.168
capita (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Life -0.237 -0.361 -0.352
expectancy (0.11) (0.19) (0.48)
Dependency -0.494 -0.442 0.032
ratio (0.12) (0.16) (0.30)
Government -0.887 -1.085 -1.545
size (0.23) (0.35) (0.68)
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.274
F 2.709 3.067
Hansen J 31.644 60.344
AR(2) -0.169 0.429
Estimator OLS RE S-GMM OLS RE S-GMM
Instruments 42 74
N 682 682 682 633 633 633
* Growth rates calculated from GDP data in real 2000 U.S. dollars. Sampling frame
selected to maximize sample size, and is hence unbalanced. Data periodicity are ve-
year averages. All variables are in log form. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A lagged dependent variable
(GMM only), period xed eects, and a constant term (all specications) were
included in the regressions, but not reported.  indicates signicance at 10 percent
level,  indicates signicance at 5 percent level, and  indicates signicance at 1
percent level.
Indeed, per capita income appears to be strongly correlated with growth polarity. In some
ways, this is not entirely surprising: economies that have historically been signicant drivers
of global growth are also generally the ones that have become developed, and this is re
ected
in the strong positive coecient on the GDP per capita variable. The magnitude of this eect
is relatively small, however, despite its strong statistical signicance: a one percent increase in
per capita income raises the polarity measure by about 0.1 percent.
Across the three specications, a one percentage point increase in the size of government
leads to a decrease in the polarity measure that ranges [0:9;1:5] percent. This negative coecient
for government size should be interpreted in light of the fact that the specication already
controls for per capita income levels. Since more developed economies tend, for political economy
reasons, to have greater government expenditures as a result of more advanced social insurance
programs (Iversen & Cusack 2000), they also possess, in general, larger governments. The
alleviated by the logarithmic transform. For the panel regressions, normal probability plots (shown in Figure
A.3 the annex) suggest that non-normality in the residuals is not an issue (we refrain from formal statistical
tests for the normality of errors in this case, since such tests are typically rejected for large sample sizes). The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic was applied to the cross-section regressions that follow, however, and the
results (available on request) are supportive of the normality of the error distribution.
18negative in
uence of government size is thus independent of the level of development, and may
be more indicative of ineciencies associated with larger governments. There are theoretical
(Meltzer & Richard 1981) and empirical (Sheehey 1993) reasons why government eciency
may fall after surpassing a given threshold for government size, and consequently contribute
negatively to growth (and thus, indirectly, to growth polarity).1718
The negative eect of the dependency ratio|a one percent increase reduces growth polarity
by about 0.4 percent|is consistent with the notion that economies with a large, nonproductive
population base are less likely to be dynamic drivers of global growth. Probing deeper into this
variable suggests that the eect stems primarily from the size of the very young, rather than
old, population: Regressions including both the child and aged dependency ratio rather than
the total dependency ratio (reported in Table A.1) yields a (marginally) signicant negative
coecient for the child dependency variable, but not the other. However, the burden of a large
nonworking elderly population is not likely to be entirely innocuous. The coecient on life
expectancy is negative, and since economies with greater life expectancy will naturally have a
larger old-age population, there are reasons to believe that aged dependency may play a role in
reducing an economy's growth polarity. Overall, however, the eect of the dependency ratio is
somewhat less robust, owing to the fact that controlling for weak endogeneity|in specication
(P6)|does cause the variable to no longer be statistically signicant.19
Turning to the fundamental determinants, Table 5 reports the benchmark regressions for the
fundamental determinants of the aggregate growth polarity measure. The rst three columns re-
port the IV with instrument set IV-1 (F1), IV with instrument set IV-2 (F2), and system GMM
(F3) estimates for the benchmark specication proposed in Rodrik et al. (2004). The following
three columns, (F4){(F6), report coecients from the same three estimation methodologies
using a fuller specication that includes democracy and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, both
of which have been previously identied as fundamental variables of importance Alesina, East-
erly, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat & Wacziarg (2003); Barro (1996). The nal four columns include,
alternately, two additional fundamental variables that were not included in the fuller specica-
tion because they would otherwise severely compromise the already-limited sample sizes: social
capital (Knack & Keefer 1997) (columns (F7) and (F8)), and human capital (Glaeser et al.
2004) (columns (F9) and (F10)).
The benchmark results imply a very strong relationship between the quality of institutions
and growth polarity. The coecient on the institutions variable is statistically signicant in 9 of
17We should recall that the variable measures government consumption, not investment. There is therefore no
reason to believe that government investment, per se, would be less productive than private investment. Whether
this is the case is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this study.
18Regressions including an interaction term between income per capita and government size (not reported, but
available on request) further corroborate this inference. The coecient on the interaction term is negative and
statistically signicant (-0.733, p = 0.001), suggesting that the negative eect of a larger government is even
greater at higher levels of development.
19Alternatively, the loss of eciency in the GMM estimates vis- a-vis the group eects models may be responsible
for the loss of statistical signicance. In any case, we regard all proximate regressions as largely indicative of






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20the 10 specications, and economically signicant as well: estimates of the change in growth po-
larity is bounded by [0:8;4:3] percent, for every one percent improvement in institutional quality.
Moreover, postestimation tests suggest that, for cases where the specication is overidentied,
the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction (Sargan-Hansen statistics are not signicant).
Underidentication tests, however, are more problematic, especially when the sample size is
small|notably in specications (F7) and (F9)|with Anderson statistics indicating that not
all included instruments are relevant. Taken together, however, we remain modestly condent
in attributing a causal eect of institutions on growth polarity.
Integration enters with a negative and signicant coecient in a number of specications,
especially when estimated using IV. Although somewhat counterintuitive at rst glance|trade
openness has, after all, often been regarded as an important determinant of economic growth|
it is important to remember that the growth polarity measure captures not only growth, per
se, but the global spillover eects of such growth. Hence, even when considering the trade
channel alone|as summarized by, for example, (2)|it is the absolute size of trade relative to
global trade, as opposed to the volume of trade relative to the economy's size. This means
that larger economies will (owing to a gravity-type explanation) generally have a greater trade
channel impact even if they are relatively closed and, mutatis mutandis, greater growth polarity.
Indeed, comparing the relative ranking of absolute trade impact to that of trade openness (given
in annex Table A.6) reveals that open economies are not necessarily the ones with the greatest
global impact.
Another way to interpret this result is to recognize that global growth poles are likely to
have a strong internally-driven growth engine|owing mainly to domestic demand|rather than
externally-led forces. Only through robust domestic consumption and investment can we expect
the economy's growth to be sustainable, and spill over at the global level, rather than reliant
on the forces of external demand for its exports.
The other fundamental variables appear to be insignicant determinants of growth polarity.
Some caution is warranted, however, owing to the very limited country coverage of the instru-
ments (which in turn limits the sample size). For example, regressions that limit the estimates
to only institutions, integration, geography, and human capital, and using the settler mortality
instrument, indicate that human capital could actually exert a positive and marginally signif-
icant impact on growth polarity (to the exclusion of institutions).20 Moreover, the relatively
poor goodness of t (as captured in the F test) also suggest that the results in (F6) and (F8)
should be interpreted judiciously.
20These are not reported but the results are available on request. We are somewhat agnostic about these
estimates in part because of concerns of micronumerosity (a very small sample size of 15), but results such as
these justify our call for the exercise of caution.
215 Multipolarity: The distribution of growth polarity
5.1 Concentration indices
To better understand the evolution of growth polarity over time, especially in terms of growth
poles at the global level, we require some index that captures the relationship between the poles,
especially the major ones. One such measure would be a concentration index. There are three
common measures of economic concentration, or resource-based power. The most popular of














where rjt is the relative polarity share of country j at time t, and J (t) is the set of N = 15
economies with the highest P measure at time t. This index may be further normalized so








This measure is essentially equivalent to the well-known Ray-Singer concentration index (Ray











where cit is in this case dened as the share of aggregate \capabilities" of a given power i at
time t. However, the literature often treats capabilities in terms of straightforward economic
size, rather than potential in
uence as captured by economic spillovers.






















j =N is the mean of the polarity measure in the top 15 economies. This can






One advantage of considering these two indices in tandem is that they possess properties that
render the former more sensitive to changes in large economies, and the latter more sensitive

















21This results from the fact that H (T) is convex (concave) on total polarity shares.
22where the subscript,  j, indicates all economies other than j. As is the case for the normalized
expressions (6) and (7), (8) ranges from 0 to 1, with lower values indicating greater dispersion.
Table 6 reports the three concentration indices (6){(8) for selected period averages, with
growth polarity computed from the same four permutations in Table 3. It is clear that, regardless
of the underlying polarity measure chosen, concentration has fallen over time. Importantly,
this has occurred over the relatively short period spanned by the sample considered. This
overall decline is well captured in Figure 2, which plots three alternative concentration measures
corresponding to the benchmark aggregate growth polarity measure, computed from real GDP
growth rates and excluding migration 
ows.
Table 6: Concentration indices, selected period averages, by real and
PPP-adjusted GDP growth rates*
H T G H T G
Real PPP
without migration
1984{88 0.00583 0.01284 0.12603 0.02287 0.04682 0.25557
1994{98 0.00504 0.01064 0.09900 0.01995 0.03733 0.20204
2004{08 0.00334 0.00751 0.08268 0.01640 0.03294 0.19090
Real PPP
with migration
1984{88 0.01667 0.02288 0.17114 0.03513 0.05369 0.27763
1994{98 0.01059 0.02088 0.14169 0.02682 0.04824 0.22984
2004{08 0.00569 0.01261 0.11994 0.01726 0.03574 0.21274
* Authors' calculations, using data from the World Development Indicators. Index gen-
erated from rst principal component of (1){(5), variously excluding and including (4).
Real GDP and PPP-adjusted indicate growth rates calculated from GDP data in real
2000 U.S. dollars and constant 2005 international dollars.
y Migration 
ows are calculated for 1985, 1995, and 2005, respectively, the years where
data are available.
5.2 Toward a multipolar world
What do the changing polarities mean for the distribution of economic in
uence in the global
economy as a whole? To the extent that growth polarity is an accurate measure of such in
uence,
the results in the previous section suggest that multipolarity increased steadily through the end
of the Cold War, fell during the nal decade of the 20th century, and nally rose again in the
rst decade of the 21st century; indeed, over the past decade, the world has attained some of
the most diverse distributions since 1968.22
22The sharp decline in the early 1970s deserves some comment. This fall is a function of several factors. Most
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Source: Authors' calculations
Figure 2: Concentration measures for growth polarity shares of top 15 economies, 1972{2008,
smoothed by taking rolling ve-year averages. Polarity shares are calculated from the real GDP
growth rate. All three measures have trended downward since the mid-1970s
Thus, the world has steadily become increasingly multipolar. This rising multipolarity has
occurred in concert with the expansion of globalization. Indeed, history tells us that successive
waves of economic globalization typically have wrought periods of greater economic multipolar-
ity, along with concomitant frictions due to changes in the global conguration of geopolitical
power (Findlay & O'Rourke 2007).
Concurrent with this rising multipolarity has been a shift away from the G-7 economies as
global growth drivers, toward the economies of the developing world. This shift partly explains
why the postnancial crisis global environment has been marked by a sharp rise in interna-
tional economic tensions, with heightened protectionist sentiment, accusations of exchange rate
manipulation, and talk of trade collapse and currency wars.
Yet a deeper examination of the changes in the growth polarity indexes underlying Figure 2
suggests that the dynamics of what is captured in the gure are due not so much to a decline
of developed economies (although some absolute decline, especially in the early 1970s, indeed
occurred), but rather to a rise in the growth polarities of developing economies. Moreover, while
structural changes in both the advanced and emerging world possibly could alter this dynamic,
the overall trend toward a more multipolar world seems unlikely to change.
by the second in 1979). This negative shock was felt worldwide by all countries (apart from oil exporters), but
the slowdown was more severe for the industrial world, which had relatively larger economies at the time. This
resulted in a signicant reduction in their respective growth polarities, and hence a corresponding decrease in the
concentration indices. A secondary reason is that data coverage in the earlier years was not as comprehensive,
and to the extent that higher polarity countries are omitted, the polarity share P
 used in calculations of (6){(8)
would have been aected. An examination of the distribution of the polarity index during this time suggests,
however, that this latter concern is likely to be less of an issue, because the decline in the Herndahl-Hirschman
appears to be driven more by a signicant reduction in the polarity value for the major economies of the euro area
and the United States, rather than the introduction of high-polarity economies as the sample coverage improved.
246 Conclusion
There is no denitive method to accurately measure the polarity eects that a country exerts
on the other countries in the world economy. This paper has sought to provide a range of
empirically-grounded measures that capture the spillover eects that emanate from growth
poles, while accounting for the eect of the growth rate of the country in question relative
to the global economy. While the identied poles and potential poles are consistent with the
economies that have dominated the discussion in the literature (Buiter & Rahbari 2011; OECD
2010; O'Neill 2001; Wilson & Stupnytska 2007), the quantitatively-based selection methodology
of the current approach also identies some unexpected poles, while providing a sense of the
magnitude of each pole.
Furthermore, the study of the proximate correlates and fundamental determinants of growth
polarity point to the likely character of such poles: that they are dynamic economies that
have a high-quality institutional framework and strong internal demand, and in possession of
a relatively small nonworking population and ecient government. They are also, more likely
than not, to have higher levels of income, although whether this characteristic will persist is in
doubt, given the strong representation of developing countries in Table 3.
Future directions include applications of the polarity measure and multipolarity indices to
outstanding questions in development and international political economy. As two examples,
the growth polarity measure can be included as an explanatory variable in cross-country growth
regressions to examine the extent of growth spillovers generated from global growth poles, and
the multipolarity index can be included in regressions that examine the changing governance
structures of international organizations.
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29Technical Appendix
A.1 Data sources
measured respectively by imports as a share of global exports, capital out
ows as a share of
global in
ows, and patents as a share of global patents. The imports measure corrects for re-
exports for the major entrept economies of Singapore and Hong Kong, and for intra-monetary
union trade using bilateral trade 
ows data. The capital out
ows measure includes FDI and
portfolio capital, but excludes derivative transactions. The patents measure utilizes patent
approvals to all national patent bodies reporting to the World Intellectual Property Oce. The
expanded polarity measure additionally includes weights for the migration channel, as measured
by immigrant stock as a share of global immigrants.
Population growth was measured as the growth rate of the total population, investment
was gross xed capital formation share of GDP, enrollment was the primary school enrollment
rate, income per capita was real per capita GDP measured in 2000 U.S. dollars, health status
was the life expectancy of the population, the dependency ratio is ratio of the population
younger than 15 or greater than 65 relative to the working age population, and government size
was the government expenditure share of GDP. Alternative measures for enrollment, health,
and dependency used were the secondary school enrollment rate, the under-5 mortality rate,
and the old-age dependency ratio. Additional controls: Technology diusion was proxied by
mobile cellular subscriptions coverage, infrastructure by road density, and the regional dummies
included Africa, Latin America, and East Asia.
The measure of institutional quality was a composite measure obtained by taking the
proportion-weighted sum of the rst three principal components of 11 subcomponents of the
ICRG political risk measure: government stability, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy qual-
ity, socioeconomic conditions, investment prole, internal con
ict, external con
ict, military in
politics, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions (only the rst three components obtained an
eigenvalue greater than unity, justifying their inclusion). Alternative institutional quality mea-
sures applied: (a) inclusion of democratic accountability to the subcomponents used in the
principal components analysis; (b) restriction of the measure to only the rst four subcompo-
nents (and taking the proportion-weighted sum of only the rst two principal components);
and (c) restriction of the measure to only the rst four subcomponents (but weighting each
subcomponent equally). Economic integration was total trade (imports plus export) as a share
of GDP, and geography was the latitudinal distance from the equator.
30A.2 Additional gures
Figure A.1: Shares of global GDP, Global North and South, 1973 and 2008. The ceding of
economic share from the North to the South is clearly evident, with the increase largely led by
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Logarithm of synthetic growth polarity index
Source: Authors’ calculations.
(b) Histogram and kernel density
Figure A.2: Log-log plot of rank-synthetic growth polarity index distribution (without migra-
tion), real GDP growth rates (left panel), and histogram of synthetic polarity index and super-
imposed kernel density estimate (right panel). The former illustrates the power law-type distri-
bution, with a scaling exponent of -2.4. The latter captures the density of the log-transformed
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(b) Q-Q residual plot, (P5)
Figure A.3: Quantile plot of residuals for specications (P2) and (P5). The clustering of most
residuals around the 45-degree line corresponding to the theoretical normal distribution suggests
a reasonable t (and hence normality of residuals), although some outliers are clearly apparent.
A.3 Additional tables
Table A.1 reports robustness results for the proximate correlates of the aggregate growth polar-
ity measure. Odd-numbered specications are coecient estimates using group eects models,
while even-numbered specications are estimates using dynamic panel models. The top panel
introduces additional variables for: (R1){(R2) technology coverage; (R3){(R4) infrastructure
quality; and (R5){(R6) regional dummies. The bottom panel substitutes measures for: (R7){
(R8) primary with secondary enrollment; (R9){(R10) life expectancy with the under-5 mor-
tality rate; and (R11){(R12) the total dependency ratio with the child and aged dependency
ratios.
By and large, the coecients on the main variables that were found to be signicant in
benchmark Table 4 retain their expected signs and statistical signicance. The additional
variables introduced in the top panel are generally not signicant (which partly justies their
exclusion from the benchmark), with perhaps the exception the Latin America dummy. The
marginally statistical signicant coecient on the under-5 mortality variable in specicaiton
(R10) is consistent with the fact that a higher child mortality rate would also mean a lower
child dependency ratio, which enters with a negative coecient in specication (R11).
Several additional variables do enter as statistically signicant in some specications, and
when they do, they generally do so with the ex ante expected signs. For example, a positive
and signicant coecient on investments appears in several specications, as does population
growth (although the sign on this latter variable is somewhat less stable).
32Table A.1: Robustness regressions for proximate correlates of growth
polarity, 1968{2008, with real GDP growth rates*
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Population 0.718 -1.428 0.407 0.760 0.521 -7.140
growth (0.94) (1.80) (0.62) (1.59) (1.03) (3.20)
Investment 0.171 0.456 0.285 0.418 0.468 0.904
(0.13) (0.35) (0.19) (0.28) (0.15) (0.41)
Enrollment 0.019 0.174 0.077 -0.120 0.099 -0.126
(0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.14)
Income per 0.142 0.179 0.087 0.180 0.108 0.127
capita (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Life -0.187 -1.177 -0.222 -1.389 -0.243 0.096
expectancy (0.16) (0.65) (0.19) (0.66) (0.18) (1.04)
Dependency -0.493 -0.092 -0.367 -0.546 -0.530 -0.086
ratio (0.17) (0.33) (0.19) (0.44) (0.20) (0.43)
Government -0.628 -1.311 -1.300 -1.501 -0.850 -1.743







Latin America -0.098 -0.149
(0.06) (0.06)
East Asia 0.033 -0.003
(0.06) (0.14)
F 3.421 2.696 4.312
Hansen J 67.345 70.913 55.126
AR(2) -1.811 -1.418 -1.017
Estimator FE S-GMM RE S-GMM RE S-GMM
Instruments 79 74 77
N 611 611 261 261 489 489
R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
Population 2.570 -2.668 16.343 20.984 0.257 -1.613
growth (1.47) (2.34) (8.94) (14.14) (1.57) (2.23)
Investment 0.274 0.548 0.512 -1.994 0.344 0.539
(0.15) (0.36) (0.75) (1.81) (0.14) (0.39)
Enrollment -0.252 -0.047 -0.019 -0.084
(0.52) (1.16) (0.04) (0.13)
Income per 0.110 0.158 0.498 0.416 0.121 0.145
capita (0.02) (0.05) (0.15) (0.19) (0.03) (0.05)
Life -0.460 -0.637 -0.184 -0.067
expectancy (0.19) (0.44) (0.21) (0.43)
Dependency -0.441 -0.056 -0.132 -1.106
ratio (0.16) (0.29) (0.65) (0.74)
Government -1.158 -1.536 -1.293 0.735 -1.152 -1.596





Child dependency -0.162 0.125
ratio (0.09) (0.22)
Aged dependency -0.083 0.129
ratio (0.10) (0.12)
F 2.867 3.001 3.292
Hansen J 66.120 14.671 60.716
AR(2) 0.548 -0.258 0.380
Estimator RE S-GMM FE S-GMM RE S-GMM
Instruments 74 64 82
N 608 608 203 203 633 633
* Growth rates calculated from GDP data in real 2000 U.S. dollars. Sampling frame
selected to maximize sample size, and is hence unbalanced. Data periodicity are ve-
year averages. All variables are in log form. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A lagged dependent variable
(GMM only), period xed eects, and a constant term (all specications) were in-
cluded in the regressions, but not reported.  indicates signicance at 10 percent
level,  indicates signicance at 5 percent level, and  indicates signicance at 1
percent level.
33Tables A.2 and A.3 report, without comment, the analogous benchmark results for Tables 4
and 5, but with the aggregate growth polarity measure using PPP growth rates. By and large,
the results presented in these two tables are qualitatively similar to the measure using real
growth rates. Due to the more limited coverage of the PPP series, the regressions are for a
smaller sample.
Table A.2: Benchmark regressions for proximate correlates of
growth polarity, 1981{2008, with PPP GDP growth rates*
AP1 AP2 AP3 AP4 AP5 AP6
Population -1.176 -0.092 -0.046 -0.313 -0.357 -2.865
growth (1.02) (0.21) (0.28) (1.17) (1.12) (2.23)
Investment 0.164 -0.028 -0.122 0.206 0.055 0.360
(0.16) (0.11) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.21)
Enrollment 0.103 0.024 -0.012 -0.002 0.027 -0.050
(0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
Income per 0.058 0.041 0.106
capita (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Life -0.214 -0.182 -0.286
expectancy (0.07) (0.09) (0.32)
Dependency -0.240 -0.328 0.037
ratio (0.08) (0.09) (0.15)
Government -0.681 -0.423 -0.673
size (0.18) (0.18) (0.25)
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.167
F 1.660 3.056
Hansen J 62.669 71.109
AR(2) -0.634 -0.487
Estimator OLS RE D-GMM OLS RE S-GMM
Instruments 58 70
N 592 592 451 555 555 555
* Growth rates calculated from GDP data in constant 2005 international purchasing
power parity-adjusted dollars. Sampling frame selected to maximize sample size,
and is hence unbalanced. Data periodicity are ve-year averages. All variables
are in log form. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. A lagged dependent variable (GMM only), period xed
eects, and a constant term (all specications) were included in the regressions, but
not reported.  indicates signicance at 10 percent level,  indicates signicance















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Tables A.4 and A.5 report, without comment, the analogous benchmark results for Tables 4
and 5, but with the aggregate growth polarity measure computed with migration 
ows (and
using real GDP growth rates). By and large, the results presented in these two tables are
qualitatively similar to the measure using real growth rates.
Table A.4: Benchmark regressions for proximate correlates of
growth polarity (with migration), 1968{2008, with GDP growth
rates*
BP1 BP2 BP3 BP4 BP5 BP6
Population -2.246 -0.233 -4.173 2.958 1.465 -0.917
growth (0.75) (0.54) (1.68) (1.00) (0.88) (1.25)
Investment 0.061 -0.050 -0.001 0.047 0.091 0.269
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.19)
Enrollment -0.003 -0.039 0.004 -0.060 -0.028 -0.043
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
Income per 0.040*** 0.052 0.093
capita (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Life -0.082 -0.212 -0.197
expectancy (0.07) (0.10) (0.29)
Dependency -0.287 -0.224 0.017
ratio (0.07) (0.09) (0.16)
Government -0.629 -0.820 -1.154
size (0.19) (0.24) (0.40)
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.179
F 2.602 3.233
Hansen J 74.043 57.330
AR(2) -0.626 -0.527
Estimator OLS RE S-GMM OLS RE S-GMM
Instruments 74 74
N 673 673 673 628 628 628
* Growth rates calculated from GDP data in constant 2005 international purchasing
power parity-adjusted dollars. Sampling frame selected to maximize sample size,
and is hence unbalanced. Data periodicity are ve-year averages. All variables
are in log form. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. A lagged dependent variable (GMM only), period xed
eects, and a constant term (all specications) were included in the regressions, but
not reported.  indicates signicance at 10 percent level,  indicates signicance






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table A.6 provides rankings of the top 15 economies by trade impact, and their corre-
sponding levels of trade openness, for the period 1999{2003. It is clear that there is very
little relationship between them; indeed, the correlation between the two series is -0.091 (and
statistically insignicant at the conventional levels).
Table A.6: Top 15 countries in trade impact, 1999{2003 period average*
Country Trade impact TI Rank Trade openness TO Rank
United States 0.191 1 0.189 153
Germany 0.081 2 0.558 79
China 0.059 3 0.385 123
Japan 0.056 4 0.184 155
United Kingdom 0.056 5 0.415 118
France 0.049 6 0.435 112
Italy 0.039 7 0.427 116
Canada 0.036 8 0.672 55
Netherlands 0.032 9 1.027 19
Belgium 0.030 10 1.591 4
Spain 0.027 11 0.444 110
Mexico 0.026 12 0.524 90
South Korea 0.024 13 0.572 76
Taiwan, China 0.019 14 0.787 44
Switzerland 0.014 15 0.650 62
* Authors' calculations, using data from the Direction of Trade Statistics and World Development
Indicators. Trade impact dened as the import share of global exports, and trade openness
dened as the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP.
38